Bail conditions that require accused persons to share real-time locations, submit to biometric verification through mobile apps, or remain under continuous digital monitoring are raising serious questions about privacy, personal liberty, and the limits of judicial authority. At the heart of the issue: whether courts can actually impose technology-based surveillance requirements on people who've been granted bail and remain, legally speaking, unconvicted.
What Bail Is Actually Meant to Do
The core argument here starts with the basic purpose of bail under Sections 437 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, along with corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Bail exists to secure an accused person's presence during trial while allowing them conditional liberty — not to place them under constant electronic watch.
Legal experts argue that an undertrial remains protected by the presumption of innocence, and that restrictions imposed while granting bail should stay limited to legitimate objectives — namely, ensuring the person shows up in court and doesn't interfere with the investigation. Requiring someone to carry a phone that continuously transmits their location, or use apps involving biometric monitoring, is seen as going well beyond those legitimate objectives.
The Supreme Court's Key Ruling
The central judicial precedent here is the Supreme Court's ruling in Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, decided on July 8, 2024. The case involved a Nigerian national who had spent more than eight years as an undertrial and had been granted bail subject to several conditions — including a requirement to drop a location pin on Google Maps so the investigating agency could monitor his whereabouts.
A Bench comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan held that a bail condition allowing an investigating agency to track every movement of an accused person — whether through technology or otherwise — would violate the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21.
This ruling is seen as establishing a broader principle: bail conditions can't be fanciful, arbitrary, or excessive, and must stay tied to the legitimate purpose of ensuring attendance and cooperation with an investigation. This connects back to the privacy principles established in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, where a nine-judge Bench recognised privacy as intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21, subjecting any state interference with privacy to tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality.
Applied to digital monitoring as a bail condition, the argument is that constant surveillance may fail these standards — particularly if there's no clear statutory authority for it, if less intrusive alternatives exist, or if the privacy intrusion is disproportionate to whatever investigative benefit it actually provides.
Interestingly, Google LLC itself filed an affidavit before the Supreme Court clarifying that dropping a pin on Google Maps doesn't actually allow real-time tracking of a person or device. A shared pin is static, the user retains control over sharing it, and it doesn't give an investigating agency continuous visibility into someone's movements — a technical clarification that undercuts the practical justification for such conditions in the first place.
Trial Courts Still Imposing Tracking Conditions
Despite the Supreme Court's clear ruling, some technology-based monitoring conditions have continued showing up in trial court bail orders. A notable example is a November 2025 Delhi High Court case involving Harinder Bashishtha, where a trial court had required the accused to share his location with the investigating officer 24 hours a day through Google.
Justice Vikas Mahajan deleted this condition, relying directly on the Supreme Court's ruling in Frank Vitus. The High Court held that a trial court simply couldn't require an accused person to keep police constantly informed of his movements. The continued appearance of such conditions in lower courts points to a real gap between higher judicial precedent and everyday bail practice on the ground.
It's also worth noting that neither the CrPC nor the BNSS explicitly empowers courts to place an accused person under permanent digital surveillance after release on bail. Bail provisions traditionally deal with bonds, sureties, and reasonable restrictions on movement or travel — but they don't expressly provide for biometric check-ins or continuous geolocation tracking.
A Call for Consistent Bail Practices
Legal experts are proposing a shift away from continuous digital tracking, favouring more conventional, less intrusive reporting conditions instead. One suggested alternative: periodic physical appearance before a local police station or designated judicial officer, on a weekly or fortnightly basis depending on how serious the case is. This kind of mechanism can still ensure accountability without subjecting an accused person to round-the-clock electronic observation.
The broader concern raised is that leaving compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling entirely up to individual courts may not guarantee uniformity — especially when similar tracking conditions keep appearing even after the judgment. A common framework applicable across sessions courts and magistrate courts could help bring routine bail practice in line with constitutional privacy protections, ensuring restrictions on personal liberty remain lawful, necessary, and proportionate.
Ultimately, the underlying principle here is that bail should remain a mechanism for conditional release pending trial — not morph into a substitute form of electronic custody. Any surveillance-based conditions need to be carefully weighed against both statutory authority and the constitutional protections of personal liberty and privacy under Article 21.
FAQs
Q1. What did the Supreme Court rule in Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau?
The Supreme Court held that a bail condition allowing investigating agencies to track an accused person's every movement through technology would violate the right to privacy under Article 21.
Q2. Why are digital tracking bail conditions considered problematic?
Experts argue such conditions go beyond the legitimate purpose of bail, lack clear statutory authority under the CrPC or BNSS, and can fail tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality under Article 21.
Q3. What alternative is being suggested instead of continuous digital tracking?
Legal experts suggest periodic physical appearances before a local police station or designated judicial officer, on a weekly or fortnightly basis, as a less intrusive way to ensure accountability.